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Abstract
We show how catch-up growth can result when immigrant ties of
talented people to their home countries facilitate technology diffusion
from world technological leaders to developing countries. The aspect
of immigrant link we focus on is knowledge spillover through various
programs of international exchange to draw upon the expertise of the
individuals who have migrated—a type of externality effect on the
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home country. In our model, we distinguish between public technol-
ogy and private technology, both of which differ across countries. The
size of the talent pool in each country determines the number of skilled
workers and indigenous technology levels. The consequent gap in tal-
ent wage results in a flow of talent from South to North. We show,
however, that when the externality effect is sufficiently strong, there
is a phase of growth during which a “reverse brain drain” naturally
occurs. Our model’s prediction is consistent with the experience of
Taiwan, which saw a reverse flow of talented people during the 1970s
onwards after losing them in the 1950s and 1960s.
JEL classification: F21, F23, O14
Keywords: catch up, talent mobility, knowledge spillover
1. Introduction
There is an emergent view in the growth literature that the big gap in
income levels across countries is due to differences in the levels of total factor
productivity (Hall and Jones (1999); Parente and Prescott (2000)). From
this perspective, the explanation for the East Asian economic miracle lies in
the ability of these countries to get closer to the world technology frontier
within a relatively short time. This raises a question: What are the channels
through which technology has diffused from the advanced to the developing
economies? According to Coe and Helpman (1995), the main intermediaries
through which technology has diffused from the advanced countries to these
technological followers are international flows of goods and capital. In this
paper, we explore another mechanism that we believe is also important as a
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medium through which technology transfer can occur. This is the role played
by immigrant ties of talented people to their home country.
Our basic idea is this. If it is in the advanced economies that knowledge is
created most rapidly, both in higher educational and research centers as well
as in private sector R&D labs, losing talent to the advanced economy might
actually provide another conduit through which the developing economy can
catch up technologically provided that the immigrant link is built upon. The
aspect of immigrant link we focus on is knowledge spillover through various
programs of international exchange to draw upon the expertise of the indi-
viduals who have migrated—a type of externality effect on the home country.
If the externality effect is sufficiently strong, the consequent narrowing of the
technology gap due to the immigrant link, which will be reflected in increas-
ingly higher talent pay in the developing economy, will lead to a reversal of
the international talent flow at some point.
In our model, we make a distinction between the technology development
in the private sector and that within the public R&D and higher education
sector, which in turn differ across countries. (Public R&D and higher ed-
ucation sector is used here as a shorthand for institutions like universities,
colleges, public R&D and training centers.) We suppose that talented people
work in both the public R&D and higher education sector as well as the
private R&D sector. The former sector not only produces skilled workers
through the teaching role of talent but also conducts public technology re-
search. Talent that is employed in the private sector engages in patented
R&D and helps companies holding the patents to achieve a monopoly posi-
tion in the machine market. However, as Jafee (1989) and Sanders (1992)
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have empirically documented, academic research in university has significant
commercial spillovers to local industries. At the same time, although many
technologies are patented, companies can choose disclosure in a timely fash-
ion. Since techniques can often be transferred only at considerable cost,
firms will still have the willingness to share knowledge through publication
(Stephan, 1996). The reputation of the lab, which is directly related to
publication activity, also affects the ability of the company to hire scientists
and engineers. In addition, problems that academic scientists address often
come from ideas developed through a consulting relationship with industry
(Stephan, 1996). Finally, scientists in public and private sectors often have
a strong interaction linkage through seminars and joint projects.1 Therefore,
there is a strong empirical basis for assuming that both private and public
technologies are interdependent, as we do in this paper, being determined by
the scientists hired in both sectors.
The size of the talent pool in each country, which in this paper we shall
take as given, determines the number of skilled workers and indigenous tech-
nology levels. North is assumed to have a larger stock of talent than South.
The consequent gap in talent wage then results in a flow of talent from South
to North. The task we have set for ourselves is to ask whether a general-
equilibrium model that abstracts from any other form of international tech-
nology transfer than through the immigrant link of talent can generate the
1In fact, the research of some scientists and engineers in companies like IBM, AT&T
and Du Pont is virtually indistinguishable from that of their academic counterparts. A
number of scientists from Bell Labs, Du Pont, IBM, Smith Kline and French, Sony and
General Electric have been awarded the Nobel Prize (Stephan, 1996).
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result that a period of brain drain is naturally followed by a period of “reverse
brain drain.” We find that, indeed, when the externality effect is sufficiently
strong, there is a phase of growth during which talent that has left returns
to the source country. Our model’s prediction is consistent with the experi-
ence of Taiwan, which saw a reverse flow of talented people during the 1970s
onwards after losing them in the 1950s and 1960s.
Another satisfying prediction that our model is able to generate is that
in the catch up there is an endogenous enhancement of technology develop-
ment in higher education and research institutions, in conformity with the
experience of the four East Asian tiger economies. For example, there are
now six universities in Hong Kong and three universities in Singapore with
faculty members who have obtained higher degrees from developed countries
like America, England, and Canada. In Singapore in the 1970s, only the
University of Singapore and the Singapore Institute for Standards and In-
dustrial Research actively conducted public research. Now the number of
public R&D institutions and centers has grown to 15. The Taiwanese model
can be aptly described as a SME-public research institute innovation model
(Wong, 1995). Because of limited resources, the state played an important
role in diffusing process technologies to the SMEs through the establishment
of various product technology consortia. The most successful example is the
notebook computer consortium coordinated by the Industrial Technology Re-
search Institute. Over the past 15 years, it has been estimated that over 60
such R&D consortia have been established in various industrial sectors in
Taiwan and the “reverse brain drain” constitutes the main talent in those
institutes and in the private sector (Wong, 1995). The quality of some pub-
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lic R&D and higher education institutions in these economies has now come
close to world class status.
At the early stage of economic development in these economies, many
excellent local graduates went overseas to study and worked there after ob-
taining their higher degrees because of the lack of high-quality universities
domestically and lower local wages. As these economies gradually developed,
more overseas graduates with higher degrees have been attracted back to the
home country because of improved salary and better working environment.
See, for example, the case of Taiwan highlighted in Figure 1 and Figure 2.
From Figure 1 and Figure 2, we observe that more and more overseas talent
returned to Taiwan from the early 1970s as the Taiwanese economy devel-
oped. Figure 2 plots the ratio of returnees to students going abroad, and
shows both the annual ratio as well as the 9-year moving average ratio. The
smoothing ratio shows that in the 1950s and 1960s, Taiwan experienced brain
drain. However, since the 1970s, Taiwan has been experiencing reverse brain
drain, with small fluctuations in the late 1970s and late 1980s.2
How do we explain the reverse brain drain following the loss of talent
overseas? In examining the Taiwanese experience, Wu (1985) has pointed
out that among the talent staying overseas, many of them have been at-
tracted to go back to Taiwan as visiting scientists, professors, engineers, and
2A study by Chang (1992) shows that, in her sample, at least a third (33.9 percent)
of returnees work in the university while 7.4 percent work in research organizations in
Taiwan. Another study by Yao (1981) over the period 1960-79 shows that 58.5 percent of
returnees have Ph.D. degrees and 37.9 percent have M.A. degrees.
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so on.3 These people can be persuaded to work in Taiwan on a longer-term
basis. In Singapore, the government provides financial support for top stu-
dents to study in world-class universities overseas with a bond to serve the
country after graduation. There are also others, however, who choose to
study overseas under alternative financial arrangements. Realizing the diffi-
culty of drawing back overseas talent immediately on a permanent basis, and
perhaps spurred on by Taiwan’s strong innovation system network linkage
with overseas talent and firms in the US, Singapore’s Minister of State for
Education and Manpower recently launched the Singapore Overseas Network
(SON) to tap the talent of Singaporeans overseas, many of whom “enjoy the
distinction of having worked in two or more markets”. For those who are
not yet ready to return, SON is used as a platform for them to help enhance
entrepreneurship and innovation in Singapore. Visiting overseas scholars and
technology professionals can greatly aid the process of public technology and
education integration, thereby strengthening the developing economies’ pri-
vate technology catch-up. In addition, overseas talent directly contributes
to the developing economies’ private technology through MNCs’ technol-
ogy transfer, or technology collaboration with local companies or through
3Chang (1992) reports in her study that under the auspices of the National Science
Council and the Ministry of Education of Taiwan, more than 3,700 overseas scientists
and experts and 2,500 established scholars have returned to Taiwan as visiting professors
or as research professors. National development conferences have also been sponsored
at the Taiwanese government’s expense to discuss science and technology development,
social welfare, politics, and education involving more than 3,000 overseas scholars and
professionals.
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technology spin-offs. Consequently, while the technological follower suffers a
direct loss of talent, which impedes its pace of technological advance, this is
offset by an indirect gain through its talent being able to work in the tech-
nologically more advanced leader country. This facilitation of technology
transfer, paradoxically through the loss of talent overseas, ultimately leads
to a reverse brain drain as the follower country catches up technologically.
It is surprising that the presence of such a network linkage has tended to be
neglected in most models of international economic development.
Instead, the mainstream of economic theory in the 1970s held that brain
drain is an unmitigated loss to the home country and unambiguously harms
those left behind. The research focus was on the systematic examination of
the tax arrangements that should govern highly skilled migration (Baumol,
1982; Bhagwati and Partington, 1976; Mirrlees, 1982; Pomp and Oldman,
1979; Wilson, 1980). For example, India, the Philippines, Cuba and Italy
are often cited as negative examples of the loss from brain drain (Bhagwati,
1983). Johnson (1965) may be the first economist to emphasize the advan-
tages of brain drain to the countries of origin and destination. He argued that
the migrants can make a large transfer to the home country in a way that is
likely to compensate for the education cost to the country of origin. In point-
ing to an externality effect, Gould (1994) comes close to the analytical insight
of our paper. He illustrates empirically that immigrant information can play
an important role in determining US bilateral trade flows. Immigrant ties
include the knowledge of home country’s market, language, preference, and
business contacts that can potentially decrease the transaction cost of bilat-
eral exchange. Therefore, migrants can facilitate bilateral trade between the
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host and home countries. Our paper points to how immigrant links lead to
an increase in worldwide technology transfer and how the “overseas brain
stock” contributes to both the source and receiving countries. This mecha-
nism is relevant in light of the work in endogenous growth, especially that
emphasizing human capital externalities such as that by Lucas (1988), and
diffusion of knowledge and technology such as that by Romer (1990).4
To study the effect of talent mobility on technology diffusion and edu-
cation integration in the international economy, we introduce a public R&D
and higher education sector to the endogenous technological change model of
Romer (1990) in a two-country setting. We obtain higher wage for talent in
the North compared to that of the South due to a larger talent stock in the
North. Talent will move from South to North in response to the higher wage.
An implication of the model without the presence of an overseas talent exter-
nality effect in Section 2 is that the mobility of talent will reduce Southern
growth and talent will never have an incentive to return to the home country.
Section 3 extends the model to incorporate the externality effect of Southern
overseas talent on the source country’s public and private technologies. This
externality effect refers to the contribution that talent from the South makes
to raising the technology level and training of skilled workers in their home
4Mountford (1997) presents a model highlighting a different mechanism through which
a brain drain could be good for the source country. His idea is that a person who faces
a chance of being able to emigrate, and so faces a higher expected earning stream, is
induced to acquire higher skills. Since, ex post, not everyone successfully emigrates, the
source country ends up with a higher average skill level in a world with some brain drain
allowed.
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country as visiting scholars and advisors, even though they live and work in
the North. The loss of talent overseas paradoxically facilitates technology
diffusion, which we describe as an externality effect, thus enabling the tech-
nological follower to catch up to the technological leader. As mentioned, this
effect seems to have been important in the economic development of Taiwan,
especially so in the eighties and nineties. Section 4 presents the conclusion,
the discussion of some public policy implications and the limitations of our
paper.
2. Structure of the model without overseas talent externality effect
Any paper attempting to discuss growth in an idea-based world articu-
lated by Lucas (1988), Romer (1990) and Grossman and Helpman (1991), as
this paper attempts to do, must face the Jones (1995a) critique, commonly
referred to as the problem of the scale effect. This class of endogenous growth
models produces the result that an increase in the stock of resources engaged
in the R&D activity leads to a permanent increase in the economy’s growth
rate. Kremer (1993), in a very innovative piece of work entitled, “Population
growth and technological change: One million B.C. to 1990,” finds that the
growth rate is positively related to the size of the world population, which
we take the R&D resources to be proportional to, and so finds support for
this class of models. Looking at the U.S. economy over a century long, how-
ever, Jones (1995a) finds that although the number of R&D scientists and
other measures of research intensity have increased quite steadily, there is
no evidence that the growth rate of the U.S. economy has also increased
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in tandem. He proposed (Jones, 1995b), instead a semi-endogenous growth
model where the economy’s growth rate is proportional to the rate of growth
of population. In his model, increasing the size of the talent pool has a scale
effect on the level, but not the growth rate, of GDP per capita.
In trying to grapple with the differing levels of technology sophistication
in the North-South segments of the world in our paper, what assumptions
should we make about the scale effect? If we adopt the Jones’ character-
ization (applied to the U.S.) that the pace of technology development is
proportional to the national population growth rate, we would end up with
the counterfactual implication that technology development proceeds more
rapidly in the South than in the North since the South has obviously the
higher population growth rate. A way to deal with this counterfactual impli-
cation is to suppose that no technology development takes place in the South
at all, and that the technology frontier is pushed ahead only by efforts of sci-
entists in the North, which is then diffused to the rest of the world. Yet, for
the purpose of our analysis, it is important to take note that even in devel-
oping countries, there are universities where both teaching and research do
take place although the knowledge frontier there is not proceeding as rapidly
as in advanced economies. In fact, as pointed out earlier, we want to be
able to explain how the quality of higher education and research institutions
endogenously improves in the catch up. We will, therefore, proceed in our
modeling efforts by adopting the original Lucas-Romer-Grossman-Helpman
formulation, treating the world stock of talent as given, with the North hav-
ing a larger stock. When we allow for international migration, part of the
Southern stock of talent will emigrate to the North in response to the higher
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talent wage. Population growth through natural increase in North and South
is assumed to be zero although North will face population increase through
in-migration while Southern population will decrease or increase depending
on out-migration and reverse brain drain.5
Consider first a single closed economy. There is a single final good pro-
duced with the following production function: Y = (1−α−β)−1LαuLβs
∫ A
0 x
1−α−β
i di,
where Y is final output, Lu is unskilled labor, Ls is skilled labor and xi is
the output of machine i. We impose the conditions 0 < α, β, α + β < 1.
The atomistic suppliers of the final good operate in a perfectly competitive
environment, choosing the optimal employment of each type of labor and the
optimal demand for xi with i ranging from 0 to A. The following first-order
conditions are obtained after imposing the condition of symmetry so that
xi = xj = x:
A(
α
1− α− β )L
−(1−α)
u L
β
sx
1−α−β = wu, (1)
A(
β
1− α− β )L
α
uL
−(1−β)
s x
1−α−β = ws, (2)
LαuL
β
sx
−(α+β) = px, (3)
where wu is unskilled wage rate, ws is the skilled wage rate, and px gives the
relative price of machine, all measured in terms of the numeraire good, which
is the final output.
Machine i is produced in a monopolistically competitive environment us-
ing the design blueprint protected by patent. We suppose that the marginal
5To keep our analysis simple, we will assume that only talent is free to emigrate.
Production workers do not face this option.
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cost is a constant γ measured in units of the final good and is the same
for all i. The MC=MR rule gives, under symmetry, the following condition:
px = γ/(α+β). Without loss of generality for our purpose, we set γ ≡ α+β
so we simply have
px = 1. (4)
Motivated by the empirical evidence that both private and public sector
technologies are interdependent, being determined by the scientists employed
in both sectors, we posit the following specifications for technology develop-
ment:
A˙ = AS(1+η)/2S(1−η)/2p ; 0 < η < 1,
A˙p = ApS
(1−η)/2S(1+η)/2p ,
where A is a measure of private-sector technology development, Ap is a mea-
sure of public-sector technology development, S is the stock of talent em-
ployed in private-sector R&D and Sp is the stock of talent employed in the
public-sector R&D and higher education sector. (A dot represents a time
derivative.) We let the total stock of talent available be given by S¯ so full
employment of talent implies:
S¯ = S + Sp. (5)
Along a balanced growth path, A˙/A = A˙p/Ap = g, which implies that
S =
S¯
2
, (6)
Sp =
S¯
2
, (7)
g =
S¯
2
. (8)
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Talent working in the public R&D and higher education sector plays the dual
role of teacher-researcher. In the teaching role, we assume that to maintain
the quality of teaching, universities maintain a certain student-faculty ratio.
Training is instantaneous so letting λ be the student-faculty ratio, we have
Ls = λSp. (9)
Also, letting the total number of production workers employed in the manu-
facturing facility be L¯, we have, since L¯ = Lu + Ls, that
L¯ = Lu + λSp. (10)
Let us now determine the market remuneration for talent. We note that
to generate one additional private-sector R&D blueprint, that is, to obtain
A˙ = 1, we need S = [A2/(1+η)S(1−η)/(1+η)p ]
−1 units of private-sector talent so
current private sector R&D cost ≡ wT
A
2
1+ηS
1−η
1+η
p
,
where wT is the real remuneration to private-sector talent. With free entry
into the private-sector R&D activity, the value of a firm, V , must be driven to
equal the current R&D cost. Along a balanced growth path, V = pi/r, where
pi = (px− γ)x and r is the real interest rate. With our earlier normalization,
pi = [1− (α + β)]x. To solve for x, we use (4), (9) and (10) in (3) to obtain
x =
(
L¯− λS¯
2
) α
α+β
(
λS¯
2
) β
α+β
. (11)
Using (11), we obtain an expression for dividend per share:
pi = [1− (α + β)]
(
L¯− λS¯
2
) α
α+β
(
λS¯
2
) β
α+β
. (12)
14
To obtain an expression for the equilibrium real interest rate, we posit
a representative household with the utility function:
∫∞
0 (1 − θ)−1[C1−θt −
1] exp−ρt dt, where θ > 0, and the following intertemporal budget constraint:∫ ∞
0
Ct exp
−
∫ t
0
rsds dt = W0 +
∫ ∞
0
Yt exp
−
∫ t
0
rsds dt−
∫ ∞
0
Tt exp
−
∫ t
0
rsds dt,
where ρ is the subjective rate of time preference, W0 is initial non-human
wealth and T denotes the lump-sum tax imposed to finance public-sector
talent, whom we assume is also paid wT . The government, who hires public
sector talent, is assumed to match what private sector talent is paid, and
meets the wage bill from its tax revenue. In equilibrium, T = wTSp. The
Keynes-Ramsey rule coming out from solving the representative agent’s opti-
mization problem gives, along a balanced growth path, g = θ−1(r−ρ). Using
(8), we then have an expression for the equilibrium real interest rate:
r =
θS¯
2
+ ρ. (13)
Using the free entry condition along with (12) and (13), we have, after
some rearrangement and collection of terms, an expression for the equilibrium
talent wage:
wT =
[1− (α + β)](L¯− λS¯
2
)
α
α+βλ
β
α+β ( S¯
2
)
β
α+β
+ 1−η
1+ηA
2
1+η
θS¯
2
+ ρ
. (14)
Notice from (14) the role played by the interdependency between private and
public technology development. We can see that when η = 1, the case where
there is no interdependency, a one percent increase in A leads to exactly a
one percent increase in wT , ceteris paribus. This is no longer the case when
0 < η < 1, where there is a positive spillover between technology development
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in the two sectors. In the latter case, a one-percent increase in A leads to a
greater than one percent increase in wT . This is because an increase in private
sector technology development benefits the pace of public sector technology
development, which then feeds back positively onto private sector technology
development and so on in a convergent manner, hence increasing the reward
to talent more than proportionately.
Notice also how an increase in the total stock of talent affects wT , given
A. We can identify three effects: (a) Positive spillover of research by public
sector talent, captured by the term (S¯/2)(1−η)/(1+η); (b) Scale effect of S¯ on
x, captured by the term [L¯ − (λS¯/2)]α/(α+β)[λS¯/2]β/(α+β); and (c) interest
rate effect, captured by the term in the denominator, (θS¯/2) + ρ. Through
the positive spillover effect identified in (a), an increase in S¯ increases the
productivity of private-sector research and hence raises wT . A larger stock
of talent increases the number of skilled workers for a given L¯ and reduces
the number of unskilled workers. If the share of skilled workers, β, in the
production function Y = (1−α−β)−1ALαuLβsx1−α−β is larger than the share
of unskilled labor, α, given α + β, it is more likely that an increase in S¯
increases x and hence increases the value of the firm and consequently wT .
Finally, the higher S¯ is, the faster is the economy’s growth rate, g. This
raises the real interest rate, and hence the discount rate applied to the future
stream of dividends. Through this channel, an increase in S¯ decreases wT ,
given A.
Going beyond the closed economy to look at the North-South version of
the model, we shall use an asterisk to denote a Southern variable. Supposing
that the parameters α, β, η, θ, ρ, λ, and L¯ are identical in North and South
16
so that the only difference we allow is for the stock of talent to differ with
S¯ > S¯∗, we obtain, in the absence of any international talent mobility, that6
wT
w∗T
=
 (L¯− λS¯2 )
(L¯− λS¯∗
2
)
 αα+β [ S¯
S¯∗
] β
α+β
+ 1−η
1+η
 θS¯∗2 + ρ
θS¯
2
+ ρ
 [ A
A∗
] 2
1+η
. (15)
We will suppose that, when we allow for talent to emigrate, parameters in
(15) are such that, given S¯ > S¯∗, wT > w∗T . In fact, noting from (8) that
the greater stock of talent in North implies a higher rate of growth, wT will
exceed w∗T in finite time as A/A
∗ becomes sufficiently large.
There are many factors that influence the migration decision of talent.
As a recent OECD study (2002; p. 253) puts it, people migrate to “take
advantage of higher wages, more exciting opportunities and changes in life
style.” We summarize the number of units of Southern talent expressing
an intention to migrate to the North by the function M(wT/w
∗
T ) such that
M ′(·) > 0. Allowing for international migration of talent from South to
North, (15) is transformed to
wT
w∗T
=
 (L¯−
λ
(
S¯+M(
wT
w∗
T
)
)
2
)
(L¯−
λ
(
S¯∗−M(wT
w∗
T
)
)
2
)

α
α+β  S¯ +M(wTw∗T )
S¯∗ −M(wT
w∗T
)

β
α+β
+ 1−η
1+η
×
6In international comparisons, it has been found that pupil-teacher ratios for developed
and developing countries are actually quite close. For example, in 1990, the pupil-teacher
ratio for Japan is 25 and for China it is 22 (World Education Report, 1993). In our model,
we assume that the pupil-teacher ratio is the same for both the North and South. Despite
that, we shall find that due to the greater stock of talent in the North, technology grows
at a more rapid pace so skilled workers will find their remunerations growing at a more
rapid pace in the North than in the South.
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
θ
(
S¯∗−M(wT
w∗
T
)
)
2
+ ρ
θ
(
S¯+M(
wT
w∗
T
)
)
2
+ ρ

[
A
A∗
] 2
1+η
. (16)
In a diagram (not drawn) with wT/w
∗
T on the horizontal axis, the LHS of
(16) can be represented as a 45-degree line. For given A/A∗, we can depict
the RHS of (16) either as a downward-sloping schedule or an upward-sloping
schedule. If upward-sloping, we assume that it is less steep than the 45-
degree line and crosses it only once. Then we can write wT/w
∗
T = φ(A/A
∗)
with the property that φ′(·) > 0. With this, we can simply express migration
as a function of q and write M(q), where q ≡ A/A∗ and M ′(·) > 0.
It is straightforward to see that in such a world, talent in the South
has strong incentive to migrate to the North. As the South loses talent to
the North, its research capability suffers and its capacity to train workers is
reduced. Southern growth steadily declines until all its talent is lost to the
North. We obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 1: In a model without the overseas talent externality effect, the
higher endowment of talent in the North will lead to a continuous outflow of
Southern talent with the consequence that the technology gap and wage gap
will become ever greater until all talent is lost to the North.
3. International talent mobility with externality effect
We wish now to capture the notion that the South can benefit from its
overseas talent that is currently working in the North through various inter-
national exchange programs. Because of the importance of human capital
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externalities that we stress, whether talent is employed in the private sector
or public research institution, the North is the place where new ideas and
knowledge frontier are constantly pushed forward at a rapid pace. Since its
overseas talent is where the action is, the South paradoxically benefits more
the greater the number of its stock of talent working overseas provided that
it builds up strong networks to facilitate the international exchange. Those
who return permanently to work in the South after a temporary stint of
research work in the North lose the benefit of working in a more vibrant
research environment in the North. What we want to show now is that if the
externality effect is sufficiently strong, reverse brain drain naturally occurs,
which generates direct benefits to the South but, by the same token, there is
an indirect loss from moving away from a more vibrant research environment.
The public technology gap also steadily closes in the transition. We obtain
a steady-state condition where there is an equilibrium technology gap—in
both public as well as private technologies—sustained by knowledge spillover
generated by an overseas talent stock through immigrant links.
Interestingly, after Taiwan has caught up to developed country status,
top local graduates nowadays prefer to finish their higher degrees in local
universities and find a job in Taiwan upon graduation. The overseas tal-
ent pool of Taiwan has shrunk, making the utilization of remaining overseas
brain power and building up of overseas talent network linking the domestic
economy even more imperative. The Taiwanese government has recognized
this, and more official as well as unofficial organizations promoting overseas
talent network and technology transfer like the Monte Jade Science and Tech-
nology Association have been set up since the early 1990s, especially in the
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high tech industry in Taiwan.7
To introduce the overseas talent externality effect on the South, the ac-
cumulation functions of public technology and private technology need to be
modified. We assume the externality effect in the public research sector can
be represented by ζ = f(M(q), k), where q ≡ A/A∗, introduced earlier, is the
North-South private technology gap, k ≡ Ap/A∗p is the North-South public
technology gap, and ζM > 0, ζk > 0. We have ζM > 0 since the more talent
overseas, the more South will benefit from the externality effect. We have
ζk > 0 to capture the benefit of relative backwardness (see Gerschenkron
(1962); Findlay (1978)). For simplicity, we use the following functional form:
ζ = f(M(q), k) = k + a1(q − 1)− c1, (17)
where the first term, k, indicates that the larger the public technology gap,
the stronger the catch-up effect; a1 is a parameter capturing the government’s
effort to utilize overseas talent; and the constant term c1 represents exogenous
barriers to technology transfers. For example, the reduced cost of cross-
border communications made possible by the internet is represented as a
decrease in c1. Assuming that public sector technology development greatly
benefits from the externality effect, we set a1 > 1.
Incorporating the externality effect in the public research sector, we can
7The OECD report (2002, p. 256) describes a group of Taiwan returnees, characterized
as “temporary returnees” or “transnational workers”, who work on both sides of the
Pacific. It says, “Their families are based in the United States. They play a role as
middlemen, linking businesses in the two regions through their personal networks and
their technological and market know-how.”
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describe the evolution of the public sector technology gap as follows:
k˙
k
=
[S¯ +M(q)]
2
− [S¯
∗ −M(q)]
2
− ζ = c1 + c2 − k − (a1 − 1)(q − 1), (18)
where c2 ≡ (S¯ − S¯∗)/2. Rewriting, we have
k˙ = k[c1 + c2 − k − (a1 − 1)(q − 1)] = Γ(k, q), (19)
Γkk(k, q) = −2 < 0, (20)
Γkq(k, q) = 1− a1 < 0. (21)
Turning now to the externality effect in private sector technology devel-
opment, we assume that it can be represented by ² = h(M(q), k, q) where
²M > 0 since the more overseas talent, the stronger the externality effect;
²k < 0 to capture the idea that if the public technology gap is very wide, the
follower country is less capable of absorbing superior private technology from
abroad since educated workers have comparative advantage in implementing
new technologies (see Nelson and Phelps (1966) for the theoretical argument
and Bartel and Lichtenberg (1987) for empirical support); and ²q > 0 (re-
ferring to the partial derivative with respect to the third variable, q, in the
function) to capture the relative backwardness effect. Again, to simplify, we
choose the following functional form:
² = h(M(q), k, q) = q + a2(q − 1)− k − c1, (22)
where the first term, q represents the relative backwardness effect; a2 is a pa-
rameter capturing the benefits generated from having talent working abroad;
and c1, as before, represents exogenous cross-country barriers to technology
transfers. We assume that 0 < a2 ≤ 1 < a1 since private technology is less
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accessible than public technology. The appearance of k with a negative sign
in front indicates that a narrower public technology gap facilitates reaping
the overseas talent externality benefit in private technology catch up. For ex-
ample, skilled workers with better grounding in science and mathematics are
more adaptive to advanced technology (see Bartel and Lichtenberg, 1987).
Incorporating the externality effect in the private technology sector, we
can describe the evolution of the private sector technology gap as follows:
q˙
q
=
[S¯ +M(q)]
2
− [S¯
∗ −M(q)]
2
− ² = k − a2(q − 1) + c1 + c2 − 1. (23)
Rewriting, we have
q˙ = q[k − a2(q − 1) + c1 + c2 − 1] = Ψ(k, q), (24)
Ψqq(k, q) = −2a2 < 0, (25)
Ψqk(k, q) = 1 > 0. (26)
Equations (19) and (24) make up a system of two dynamic equations in
k and q. The steady-state values (kss, qss) corresponding to k˙ = q˙ = 0 are
given by
kss =
(c1 + c2)(1 + a2 − a1) + a1 − 1
a1 + a2 − 1 , (27)
qss = 1 +
2(c1 + c2)− 1
a1 + a2 − 1 . (28)
Equation (28) gives the commonsensical result that, in steady state, in-
creased effort spent in devising programs to draw upon the expertise of
overseas talent, both in the public and private research institutions, so a1
and a2 are large lead to a narrower private technology gap. Moreover, rel-
ative abundance of talent compared to the North (a small c2) and lower
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cross-country communications barriers (a small c1) lead to smaller private
technology gaps. Assuming that c1 + c2 > 1/2 also ensures that in steady
state, there is a positive stock of overseas talent. Noting that we can write,
kss = c1 + c2 − (a1 − 1)(qss − 1), we note that changes in a1, c1 and c2 have
ambiguous effects on kss since the indirect effects through qss work in an
opposite direction from the direct effects. For example, a reduction in c1 due
to the introduction of the internet directly lowers kss but since it also leads
to reduced qss and so a reduced number of talented people working overseas,
the benefits from international spillover are also reduced, which works to
increase kss.
Conditions (20), (21), (25) and (26) ensure that we obtain global stability.
Figure 3 depicts a phase diagram of this system. The stationary locus (KK)
representing k˙ = 0 is negatively sloped while the stationary locus (QQ)
representing q˙ = 0 is positively sloped. The arrows of motion in the four
regions are indicated in Figure 3.
Suppose that we start off from an initial position where k0 > kss and
q0 > qss so both the private and public technology gaps are wide, and the
economy is in region I. The trajectory traced out in Figure 3 shows that while
the public technology gap steadily narrows, there is an initial phase where
the private technology gap widens before it reverses and begins to narrow.
The reason that the private technology gap initially widens with international
emigration of talent has to do with the fact that with the public technology
gap being so wide initially, the South is not capable of fully implementing
new private technology available from the North—the comparative advan-
tage of educated workers in implementing private sector technology—so the
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direct effect of losing talent overseas dominates. Ultimately, the narrowing
of public technology gap leads to a point where the South can fully bene-
fit from having its talent work in a more attractive research environment in
the North. From that point onwards, private technology gap begins to nar-
row. Corresponding to this time path of the private sector technology gap,
q ≡ A/A∗, which translates into a corresponding monotonic shift of the tal-
ent wage gap, wT/w
∗
T , the units of Southern talent emigrating to the North
increase before a brain drain reversal occurs.
Now, the mere presence of an overseas talent externality effect is not
sufficient for there to be a reverse brain drain. The externality effect has to
be sufficiently strong. In Figure 4, we depict the dynamics for a case where
a1 + a2 < 1. (In contrast, in the case we have just studied, where a reversal
of brain drain occurs, the condition a1+a2 > 1 is satisfied.) We see in Figure
4 that the public technology gap initially narrows in phase I but then begins
to widen in phase II; the private sector technology gap, and consequently the
talent wage gap as well, however, steadily widen and so there is never a point
of brain drain reversal. We have the following proposition:
Proposition 2: In a model with a sufficiently strong overseas talent externality
effect, there is an initial phase of growth when talent migrates from the South
to the North. There is, however, a point when a reversal of brain drain occurs.
How long does it take for a reversal of brain drain to occur? To address
this question, we present numerical simulations in the Appendix aimed at
studying how the time before a reverse brain drain occurs is affected by
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two alternative strategies: (a) Efforts to boost immigrant links in the public
higher education and research sector through visiting professor and scientist
schemes to tap on the expertise of overseas talent, amounting to an increase
in the parameter, a1; and (b) Efforts to boost immigrant links in the private
R&D sector through initiatives such as the Taiwanese schemes to develop
networks with Taiwanese entrepreneurs with firms both in Silicon valley as
well as in Taiwan, amounting to an increase in the parameter, a2. We find
that under our parameter restriction, a1 + a2 > 1, (a) Increasing a1, holding
other things unchanged, reduces the time at which the reversal of brain drain
occurs and also reduces both kss and qss; and (b) Increasing a2, holding other
things unchanged, reduces the time it takes for the reversal of brain drain to
occur and reduces qss but increases kss.
The first strategy aims to directly raise the standard of higher education
and scientific knowledge in the follower country and to close the public tech-
nology gap with the world technology leader. Since educated workers have
a comparative advantage in implementing private technology, this strategy
results in a closing up of the private sector technology gap as well, implying
a narrowing of the talent wage gap. This hastens the return of some of the
overseas brain stock. The second strategy, on the other hand, tries to close
the private sector technology gap directly, and consequently the talent wage
gap is narrowed, thus attracting back home some of its overseas talent. The
early return of overseas talent, both in the private and public sectors, means
that the source country has fewer units of talent working in the best research
environment in the world hence limiting the size of the externality effect.
Paradoxically, raising a2 leads to a widening of the public technology gap.
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It is apparent that, provided the externality effect is sufficiently strong,
both the North and South end up growing at the same higher growth rate
in the steady state with perfect international talent mobility compared to
the situation with zero international talent mobility. There is parallel con-
vergence in the sense that in the steady state with free international talent
mobility, South grows at the same (higher) rate as North, maintaining a con-
stant gap in the sense of constant ratios such as qss ≡ A/A∗ and kss ≡ Ap/A∗p.
We have the following proposition:
Proposition 3: After talent mobility in a world with sufficiently strong exter-
nality effect, both North and South experience in the steady state the same
higher technology growth rate compared to a completely immobile world.
Consequently, the wages for skilled and unskilled workers as well as talent
wage in North and South also grow at the same higher rate.
4. Conclusion
Our paper has highlighted the importance of international mobility of
talent in facilitating cross-national technology diffusion, and a policy mes-
sage emerges from our analysis. From a developing country’s point of view,
opening up to the world and allowing the outflow of home country talent can
eventually facilitate its catch up to the world’s technological leader. Home
country’s private and public technology development is enhanced through
the benefit of having its talent work in the best research environment in the
world. If strong immigrant ties lead to effective technology transfers, the
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ensuing growth catch up can raise the standard of living of those left behind.
It is natural that at the beginning of opening up, many talented people
will flow out of the developing economy. However, provided that the immi-
grant link is built upon, part of the overseas talent will return. Hence it is
important for the developing economy to build strong overseas talent net-
works by strengthening its co-operation with international educational and
research institutions and by inviting overseas talent to be project advisors
in the private sector and encouraging temporary returnees in the form of
technology spin-offs. Our analysis suggests that it is inevitable that some
Southern talent may still stay in the North but it is precisely their being
in the more vibrant research environment that enables them to act as the
conduit for superior technology transfer.
Further extension of our model is possible. One might want to allow
those returnees who permanently stay in the South to play a more productive
role. For example, we can study whether they can establish similar overseas
networks with their former colleagues in the North for technology transfer.
We can also extend the model to study how the perspective on the issue of
foreign talent and its implied public policy differs for small open economies
like Singapore, and large economies like China. Today’s world is one that
competes for international talent. How to attract talent and make use of
world talent becomes a major issue for both large and small economies.
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Figure 1 Number of Taiwanese Overseas Returnees1,2
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Figure 2 Taiwanese Overseas Talent Return Ratio3
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Data Source: Ministry of Education, Taiwan (Web-page); Educational Statistics of Republic of China (1999) 
     Note 1.  Patronage refunds of travelling expenses for students returning from abroad have been cancelled since January 1996. 
Therefore, we only report the data on returnees up to 1995 to avoid fluctuations due to this policy shock. 
              2. There are no statistics on students returning from abroad since 1998. 
              3.  After 1989, students going overseas did not need to apply through the Ministry of Education (MOE). Therefore, after 
1989, MOE could only count the number of students abroad through the number of visas issued by foreign embassies in 
Taiwan.  The data about the number of students abroad after 1989 include short-term students and language students. To 
avoid statistical measurement inconsistency, we only calculate the return ratio up to 1988.  
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                                  Figure 3 Case of Strong Externality Effect 
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                      Figure 4 Case of Weak Externality Effect 
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Appendix. Model’s Numerical Simulation: 
 
Recall that the steady-state equilibrium point is given by: 
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1a                  2a  Ek Eq  
1.5 1 0.079 1.667 5.667 
1.4 1 0.081 2 6 
1.3 1 0.084 2.385 6.385 
1.2 1 0.089 2.833 6.833 
1.1 1 0.093 3.3636 7.3636 
     
1.5 1 0.079 1.667 5.667 
1.5 0.9 0.086 1.5 6 
1.5 0.8 0.093 1.308 5.385 
1.5 0.7 0.106 1.083 6.833 
 
It is interesting to note that when government puts in the greater effort to make use of 
overseas talent in public technology transfer (  increases, keeping other parameters 
constant), both public technology and private technology steady-state equilibrium gaps 
decrease. However, when government puts in effort to make use of overseas talent only 
in private technology transfer (  increases, keeping other parameters constant), only 
private technology steady-state equilibrium gap decreases while public technology 
steady-state equilibrium gap increases.  
1a
2a
  3
When will brain drain occur? It is intriguing that the effort to enhance both overseas 
talent’s public technology transfer and private technology transfer (either a or a  
increases) can shorten the time we need to attract back overseas talent. 
1 2
 
Time Unit in our model and Growth rate in the simulation  
 
As shown in the table above, the time we need to attract back overseas talent fluctuates 
between 0.08 and 0.1. Take the mean value of 0.09 as the time corresponding to Taiwan’s 
case, with reference to the empirical evidence of Taiwan in Figures 1 and 2. We see that 
the time for overseas talent reversal to happen is around 18 years (1951-1969). Therefore, 
one unit of time in our simulation is around 200 years. 
 
The interpretation for c  and  is as follows. 1 2c 32 =c  indicates that the exponential 
economic growth rate difference between North and Taiwan before talent mobility is 
around: 
015.0
200
3 =  
In other words, the growth rate difference in the absence of international talent mobility 
is around 1.5 percentage points. 11 =c  represents the exogenous cross-national barrier 
affecting technology transfer. 
   
A typical time path of the model is shown below: 
When ; a  5.11 =a 12 =
         c  (the exogenous cross-national barrier affecting technology transfer) ;11 =
        c  (the growth rate difference between North and South in the absence of 
international talent mobility) 
;32 =
Therefore, the steady-state equilibrium point is: 
667.1=SSk ;  667.5=SSq
 
See the time path below: 
  4
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  5
